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21. Introduction
This paper examines the performance of business group affiliated firms in China and compares
their performance with non-affiliated firms. In particular, we examine whether affiliation to a select
number of ‘national champion’ groups is associated with superior performance. By the end of 2006
there were 2,856 officially recognised business groups in China with 27,950 first- tier subsidiaries,
employing around 30 million people directly (SSBa, 2007). Beneath this first-tier, moreover,
further tiers of firms existed. While the full extent of group membership in China is unknown, case
studies suggest it may be very large (Nolan, 2001). As such, the influence and reach of China’s
business groups is already important. From within these 2,856 groups, moreover, a small subset of
around 100 were selected as ‘national champion’ trial groups. They have received a variety of
special policies, directly overseen by China’s State Council. These national champion groups are
the largest and most institutionally advanced business groups in China (Nolan 2001). Investigating
their performance may shed further light on the role of business groups in China’s notable
economic achievements. Here we examine the performance of listed firms that are affiliated with
these trial groups. This, we believe, is a relatively clean test of the benefits of group affiliation in
China. Our results shed light on matters of policy relevance, as well as on the broader discussion on
whether business groups are to be seen as ‘paragons’ or ‘parasites’ in the development process
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
In Section 2 we review relevant literature and describe the background to and characteristics of
the national champion business groups. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. Section 4
presents our empirical results. Section 5, going beyond our discussion of affiliate performance,
raises several further important questions regarding the role of business groups in China today.
China’s groups are now absorbing more and more firms and incorporating greater volumes of
private capital. As such, the sphere of influence of state groups has expanded. The clear boundaries
between state and non-state sectors that once existed have become less well defined.
2. Background and Literature Review
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) and Morck et al (2005) provide useful reviews of the business group
literature which has recently become highly topical. To briefly summarise, a key theme of this
literature has been to ask whether business groups may be seen as ‘paragons’ or ‘parasites’
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). It is argued, for example, that under certain conditions business groups
may provide benefits for member firms. Conversely, at other times there may be costs associated
with group membership. Among the benefits of group formation, it has been hypothesised that
groups may fill institutional voids that are common in emerging markets (and transition economies
in particular). By compensating for imperfect or under developed markets in finance, labour, and
products, for example, they may help facilitate exchanges that could not happen through the market
place. They thus play a positive role in firm development by reducing transactions costs. On the
other hand, a number of negative traits may also be associated with business groups, related often
to their monopoly powers, engagement in rent-seeking activities and association with crony
capitalism, moral hazard and excessive and inefficient investment. One much discussed negative
trait is that groups may develop pyramidal structures (La Porta et al, 1999; Morck et al, 2005).
Such structures allow an apex firm to control numerous other firms without having made
commensurate capital investments. This may lead to corporate governance problems and the
‘tunnelling’ of resources away from member firms. Here business groups have the potential to
destroy value. Such pyramidal groups, moreover, also allow elites, often families or the state, to
have enormous economic influence over vast corporate empires (La Porta et al, 1999). More
generally, it is speculated this may lead to a range of unhealthy macroeconomic impacts, broadly
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current discussion of business groups is dominated by whether they may be seen as paragons or
parasites (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
Building from this debate on the various strengths and weaknesses of business groups, a large
empirical literature examines whether group affiliated firms perform better than non-group
affiliated firms. The evidence, however, is rather mixed. Empirical studies comparing unaffiliated
firms to firms that are part of bank-centered keiretsus in Japan, for example, show little evidence of
superior performance (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). Similarly, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find that
business group affiliation in India is negatively correlated with profitability. In contrast, however,
Chang and Choi (1988) find that profits for group-affiliated Korean firms are higher than those of
independent firms. Khanna and Palepu (2000b) find that group membership in Chile has a positive
impact on both profitability and Tobin’s Q. While there is, therefore, some debate as to the exact
impact of business groups, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) in their comprehensive review of the business
group literature note that the performance of such groups may well be related to the particular
institutional environment in which they evolve. Under certain conditions, in other words, business
groups may play a positive role.
While interest abounds in business groups, to date only a relatively small literature exists on
China’s business groups. Smyth (2000), for example, asks ‘should China be promoting business
groups’? This investigation, while providing valuable observations and analysis, does not
undertake any new empirical analysis on business groups per se. Instead it is based largely around
a prior literature on large and medium enterprises. Nolan and Wang (1999) and Nolan (2001),
based primarily upon case studies, investigate the nature of institutional change within China’s
large business groups in the context of transition and globalisation. Several further papers employ a
quantitative approach to examine whether and under what conditions affiliated members benefit
from group membership in China. Keister (1998, 2000) examines the performance of 40 of China’s
largest groups between 1988 and 1990 using a panel data set. She finds that internal finance
companies (facilitating internal financial markets) and interlocking directorates (which promote
information exchange between group members) are associated with improved performance. She
therefore examines the extent to which the internal features of these groups (finance companies, for
example) enhance their efficiency. Yiu et al. (2005) examine the profitability of 224 business
groups (including all subsidiaries) with another purpose in mind. They wish to find out how groups
acquire resources and capabilities so that they can become successful agents to promote economic
transformation and growth. They find that group profitability is negatively related to what they call
‘endowed resources’ (including such things as the age of the group, the extent of government
ownership and the prevalence of management with government links) but positively related to what
they call ‘acquired resources’. Such resources they argue are acquired through actions such as
acquisitions, internal capability development and international diversification (Yiu et al 2005). Ma
et al (2006), on the other hand, look to examine how business groups fill ‘ownership voids’ by
serving as the direct owners of state owned enterprises in the absence of other private actors. They
find that the combination of business group affiliation and state ownership has a positive effect on
subsidiary performance. As well, therefore, as substituting for imperfect markets, they argue they
may also play an important role in ownership reforms, a point to which we later return.
Finally, the World Bank (2005) has warned of the dangers of forming business groups with
state owned parent companies. They argue such parent companies might use the proceeds from the
listing of firms, as well from ongoing earnings to fund intra-group structural reform or ill-advised
investments (such as speculation in commercial real estate). As such they argue, albeit on the basis
of limited empirical data, that such state owned groups may be especially prone to the
aforementioned tunnelling problem and require reform. We look to also shed further light on this
question.
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have positive impacts on performance, they do not directly examine whether group affiliated firms
perform better than other firms, whereas this is the key objective of our paper. To date, moreover,
no studies have specifically identified the trial national team groups. We believe, however that
these groups provide a particularly good opportunity to investigate the impact of business group
affiliation, for reasons we now discuss.
2.l China’s national champions
China’s trial groups are much larger and more sophisticated than other groups. In fact, trials and
experimentation to develop internationally competitive large business groups can be traced to a
policy directive issued by the State Council in December 1991, endorsing 55 business groups to
undergo influential trial reforms. In April 1997, a second policy directive selected a further 63
groups to join the trials (Sutherland 2001). Since this time the number of trial groups has remained
roughly at 100 with some fluctuation as groups have merged, entered or left. To a great extent the
development of the trial groups has adopted the traditional Chinese reform method of using
incremental steps, and has followed an iterative and bottom up process of experimentation and
feedback (Nolan 2001). The precise objectives of the policies, moreover, have evolved over time.
Among the most important and consistently stated objectives of the national champion policy,
however, has been to promote institutional change with a view to creating internationally
competitive groups that can lead China’s integration in the world economy (Nolan 2001;
Sutherland 2001).
To achieve this objective a variety of policies were introduced to the national champion groups,
including: the development of internal group finance companies; stock market listings; earlier and
greater freedoms within the groups giving them greater autonomy in basic decision making;
granting of import and export rights; empowerment of the group’s core with special rights to
incorporate state assets into the group; and the creation of research and technology centres. Table 1
shows the proportion of national champion business groups and other business groups that have
adopted these policies. While a proportion of non-champion groups employ all types of policies,
national champions employ a higher proportion across the board. For example, 40% of the national
champion groups had finance companies, compared to only 11% for other groups; 84% had
research and technology centres compared with 55% for other non-trial groups. Both Nolan (2001)
and Keister (1998) make the point that these groups are among the most advanced business groups
in China. As such they are arguably in the best possible position to substitute for the imperfect
markets that business groups supposedly replace.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The national champions, moreover, are very large both in absolute size and relative to other
groups. When including the parent company (in China referred to as mother company, ‘mu gongsi’,
or ‘group company’) and subsidiaries with an ownership stake in excess of 50%, the total aggregate
assets, for example, summed to US$715bn in 2003, representing an average of US$6.3bn per
group. In contrast, the 2,579 other enterprise groups were much smaller in average size (US$517m)
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both national champions and other groups experienced high annual growth, at or above 18% each
year in assets and sales, around twice the speed of national output growth. Employee growth is
lower but clearly contrary to the general trend of downsizing within state industry (falling from 55
million in 1992 to 29 million in 2002, for example, in the manufacturing sector (SSB, 2005,
p.126)). The trial groups employed around 80,000 per group, compared to 6,000 for non trial
groups. Percentage growth rates in assets, turnover and employees are lower for national
champions than for other groups, although the absolute growth is much higher.1 Between 1997 and
2003, R&D expenditure within the national team increased at an average 30% growth rate
compared to 21% for other groups, whilst R&D/turnover increased from 9.9% to 14% compared to
a decrease from 13.4% to 10.9% for other groups. The exports of the trial groups increased from
US$9bn to US$23.9bn between 1997-2003 (an average increase of 19.5%).This is similar to the
increase observed for other groups. The exports of the national champion groups and the other
enterprise groups accounted for 21% of the total value of all China’s exports in 2003, an increase
from 17% in 1997 (SSB 2004b).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Finally, the number and type of firms participating within China’s business groups has also
grown. Official data on Chinese business groups records a variety of data on the mother company
and the first tier of subsidiaries. The total number of first tier subsidiaries increased from 24,523 to
27,950 between 2002 and 2006. Their share of the total assets of the business groups also increased
from 56% to 66% (SSB, 2003; SSB, 2007). Among these subsidiaries, moreover, firms registered
as state owned became less important as a corporatisation process ensued. An increase in the
number and share of limited liability companies (increasing from 9% to 15% in terms of asset
share) and larger stock limited companies, those potentially listed on China’s stock exchanges, took
place (increasing from 10% to 20% in terms of asset share) (SSB, 2003a; SSBa, 2007). As such the
nature and ownership structure of China’s business groups, at least at the level of the first tier,
appeared to be becoming more diversified. Within the mother company, furthermore, those in
which the controlling shareholder was registered as state or collective entity decreased from 100%
to around 47% between 1997 and 2006, while the number of privately controlled groups increased
to 38% (SSB, 2007a, p. 17). For national champion trial groups, however, nearly all remained state
controlled, with the exception of two private and two collective groups.
2.2 Research questions
The trial national champion business groups are the largest and most advanced groups in China,
benefiting from a raft of experimental changes. Their characteristic features, moreover, have been
shown in other contexts to benefit group members. Keister (1998, 2000), for example, shows that
the presence of group finance companies benefits subsidiaries. If group membership in China is
beneficial therefore, arguably the firms most likely to benefit are the subsidiaries of national
champions. On the other hand, however, the greater degree of state ownership within the mother
1 For example, the average asset size for the national champions in 1997 is US$2.3bn compared to US$6.3bn
in 2003, whilst other enterprise groups increase from an average size of US$145m in 1997 to US$517m in
2003.
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Bank, 2005). Given these two apparent contradictory forces, as well as the declared policy to create
internationally competitive groups, it is of particular interest to further investigate the performance
of the national champion subsidiaries involved in the trials to create business groups.
In the next section we describe the methodology and data we employ to examine how these
subsidiaries perform relative to other firms.
3. Methodology and Data
The methodological approach we employ to test whether affiliation to national champion
business groups is beneficial is to examine how listed subsidiaries of national champion business
groups perform compared to other listed firms. The examination of group affiliated listed
subsidiaries is the approach used by the majority of empirical studies (see e.g., Hoshi et al., 1991;
Choi and Cowing, 1999). We focus on listed firms (rather than private firms) because of the more
reliable accounting data and additional share price measures available. If group affiliation improves
performance, we expect national champion listed affiliates to outperform all other listed firms
including both listed subsidiaries of other business (non-national champion) groups and
independent listed firms. Again, previous studies have also employed this approach, focusing on
whether listed firms are members or not of only the largest business groups (Choi and Cowing,
1999). Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the performance of member firms before and
after their affiliation to national champion groups because it is hard to estimate precisely when
particular groups became national champions,2 and because listing of group subsidiaries often
followed selection of the parent group as a national champion. Our approach therefore, along with
prior studies, is prone to selection bias and a potential endogeneity problem (Khanna, 2000).
In order to identify listed subsidiaries of national champion groups we use the Osiris database to
examine whether the largest shareholder in all Chinese listed companies (as of year end 2004) is a
national champion parent group. If it is, then we use the Osiris company history to establish
whether the listed subsidiaries have been subsidiaries of the national team member groups since
their initial listing. If so, they are included in the analysis. Of the 1,503 listed Chinese firms on
Osiris, we identified 87 as being subsidiaries of national champions. We collect financial
accounting data from Osiris and stock market data from Datastream, both of which date from 1998-
2004. In order to be included in the analysis, companies must be listed on both databases and have
the financial variables required for the analysis (described below). This results in a final sample of
69 national champion subsidiary listed firms and 983 other listed Chinese firms. The annual data
availability for these two sets of firms is reported in Table 3 below.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
3.1 Performance measures and specification
We examine the impact of national champion affiliation on three different performance
variables; profitability, Tobin’s Q, and share return. Profitability is the ratio of profit before interest
and taxation divided by net assets. Tobin’s Q is book value of total assets plus market value of
equity minus book value of equity divided by book value of total assets. Share return is the
2 This is because of the at times informal and experimental nature of the national champion policy. For
example, experiments with three large auto makers started in 1986 but the formal announcement of the first
batch of trial groups did not take place until 1991.
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dividends and stock splits (Datastream variable RI). Previous studies have tended to use either one
or more of these three measures of performance. We employ all three to ensure that our results are
robust to different firm performance measures. The specific econometric regression that we run is
as follows:
Performance indicator = α + β1 National champion + β2 Size + β3 Age + β4 Growth +
β5 Debt + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε (1)
National champion is a dummy variable which is set equal to one for firms that are national
team subsidiaries and zero for firms which are not. The coefficient for this dummy variable
measures the difference in the performance measure between the 69 national champion subsidiary
firms and the other 983 firms. Size is the logarithm of the book value of total assets at the beginning
of the year, which is adjusted for inflation by converting into 2004 real terms using the Chinese
Consumer Price Index (OECD Factbook 2006). Age is the logarithm of the number of years since
the firm was first listed on Datastream. Growth is the annual percentage growth rate in real sales.
Debt is long term debt divided by the sum of shareholder funds and long term debt. Industry
dummies are industry dummy variables which are set equal to one for each US SIC two digit code,
whilst Year dummies are year dummy variables. These independent variables are designed to
control for factors that may both determine our dependent variables and differ between group
affiliated firms and other listed firms.3 We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and
Huber-White (1980) robust standard errors. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles to remove influential outliers. Table 4 below reports descriptive statistics for the
sample.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
4. Results
The results of the regression models are reported in Table 5 below. The coefficient for the
national champion dummy variable is positive and statistically significant (at the five percent level
or higher) in each of the three regressions. This evidence suggests that listed subsidiaries of
national champion groups have significantly higher profitability, Tobin’s Q, and share returns than
other listed firms, after controlling for size, age, growth, leverage, industry and year fixed effects.
The results suggest that these differences are economically as well as statistically significant. In
the profitability regression (column 1), the coefficient for the national champion dummy variable is
0.012, suggesting that national champion subsidiaries exhibit a profit rate some 0.012 higher than
other firms. Given that the average profit rate for the overall sample is 0.0599 (see Table 4), the
profit rate for national champion subsidiaries is some 20% higher. Similarly, for the Tobin’s Q
regression, the national champion coefficient is 0.156, which compared to an average sample
Tobin’s Q of 1.9525, suggests that national champion subsidiaries exhibit a Tobin’s Q which is 8%
higher than other firms. Finally, for the share return regression, the national champion coefficient is
0.038 compared to an average sample share return of -0.0689, which is again an economically
meaningful difference.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
3 In untabulated univariate tests we find that, compared to other listed firms, national champion listed
subsidiaries are significantly larger, but have similar age, growth, and debt.
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significantly higher performance than other listed firms. We now subject this finding to a number
of robustness tests.
4.1 Tests of robustness
Firstly, we test the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the performance measures
used for our dependent variables. Instead of profitability before interest and taxation over net
assets, we employ net income divided by shareholders funds. Instead of Tobin’s Q we employ
market value of equity divided by shareholder funds, and instead of using the logarithm annual
share return we use the arithmetic annual return. None of these alternative definitions makes a
difference to the results in Table 5. The coefficient for the national champion dummy is
significantly positive in each case.
Secondly, we test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of additional control variables.
Our sample of 1,052 firms have their main listing on different stock markets (604 in Shanghai, 423
in Shenzhen, 23 in Hong Kong, and 2 in Singapore). We control for these differences by including
dummy variables for the different stock markets. We control for the level of firm diversification by
including a dummy variable set equal to one if the primary and secondary 2-digit SIC codes are
different from one another. We include a number of additional financial variables as explanatory
variables in each regression (intangible assets divided by total assets, current ratio, dividend payout
ratio, profitability variance). In all cases, the positive impact of national champion affiliation
remains significantly positive. The positive impact of national champion affiliation on profitability
and share return is not sensitive to exclusion of any or all of the independent variables in Table 5,
although the positive impact on Tobin’s Q does not hold if firm size is not controlled for.
A third robustness test concerns the benchmark for our national champion listed firms. In Table
5 we compared them with all other listed firms. We are able to refine this counterfactual to some
extent by classifying sample firms according to their largest shareholder. Osiris reports the largest
shareholder (for 2004) according to whether it is an industrial firm (841), government agency (93),
financial company (80), individual or family (3), or no large shareholder (35). Firstly, we restrict
the sample to either national champion subsidiaries or those whose largest shareholder is a
government agency (93). Since the latter are state owned but not group affiliated, this allows us to
test whether group affiliation has a positive impact on performance for state owned listed firms.
The regressions for this subsample show that the coefficient for the national champion coefficient
is significantly positive for profitability and share return although insignificantly positive for
Tobin’s Q. Secondly we compare national champion subsidiaries with those firms whose largest
shareholder is an industrial firm (841). This comparison allows us to examine whether affiliation to
national champion groups is more beneficial than affiliation to other groups (state owned or non-
state owned groups). 4 Regressions carried out on this restricted sample show that the coefficient
for the national champion dummy variable continues to be significantly positive for the Tobin’s Q
and share return regressions although insignificantly positive for the profitability regression.
Overall, these two tests show that national champion affiliation is beneficial compared to both
direct state ownership and to affiliation to other groups (state owned or non-state owned groups).
In summary, the results in this section show that firms that are affiliated with the national
champion groups have higher performance. This finding is robust, holding across a range of
performance measures, control variables, and benchmark firms. This is consistent with previous
4 We are unable to distinguish between those industrial firms that are state owned and those that are not.
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performance impacts (Keister, 1998; Ma et al., 2006).
5. Summary and Discussion
We have identified China’s most important business groups (the 100 plus ‘national champion’
trial groups) and investigated the performance of their listed subsidiaries. A sustained government
policy over the past 20 years has bestowed upon these groups a wide range of group rights, some of
which have been shown to be associated with successful business group performance in other
settings. The government’s objective is to make these groups internationally competitive.
Aggregate data on the groups (including mother and first tier subsidiaries) suggests that, as a
whole, these groups are very large and have grown quickly in terms of sales, assets and R&D
expenditures. Going a step further we apply a frequently used approach in the business group
literature to examine subsidiary performance (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Our analysis of the listed
subsidiaries of these national champions shows that they outperform non-affiliates in terms of
higher profitability, stock market valuations and share returns.
One interpretation is that institutional changes in the national champion groups are responsible
for the observed high performance in member subsidiaries. This argument is consistent with
previous studies which find that certain institutional features more prevalent in China’s largest
groups (such as finance companies and research and development centres) directly improve
member performance (Keister, 1998, 2000). Other studies, moreover, concentrating specifically on
China’s groups, also give reasons as to why groups may provide benefits to member firms. Nolan
and Wang (1999), for example, have suggested on the basis of numerous case studies that Chinese
groups may pool and distribute heterogeneous resources for member firms (such as management
skills, brands, sales and marketing). It has also been suggested that group membership may provide
insulation from potential or real political intervention, thus controlling an uncertain political
environment while ‘improving their access to scarce goods’ (Keister, 2000, p. 151). Moving
beyond studies of Chinese business groups, studies in other regions of the world also list numerous
credible reasons as to why business groups may enhance firm-level performance, a major one being
the presence of imperfect markets (Khanna and Yafeh 2007). It is entirely conceivable, of course,
that Chinese groups do substitute for missing markets, hence leading to lower transactions costs.
Such missing markets are particularly severe in transition economies (Keister, 1998). In other
words, in the Chinese context it is possible that business groups are ‘paragons’ as opposed to
parasites. Indeed, the only other study with direct similarities to ours, looking at listed subsidiaries
of groups, finds evidence that they may improve subsidiary performance (Ma et al 2006). Smyth
(2000), in a synthesis of current arguments, also concludes that groups may be beneficial to firm
performance in China. On balance then, there are many reasons and considerable evidence for
believing that business groups may improve firm performance in the Chinese context. Indeed, the
sheer proliferation of such groups, both state owned and private, would seem to suggest they may
enjoy some competitive advantages.
This said, as with other studies in this area, it is important to stress that this interpretation of our
results is tentative, because the methodology does not establish causality. The results could instead
equally well be explained by national champion groups listing well performing firms, or policy
makers successfully ‘picking winners’. In addressing whether performance has been better for
national champions, moreover, it is impossible to take into account whether there are direct
interventions that may lead to better performance among these listed subsidiaries (preferential
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access to material supplies, finance, foreign investment, public procurement and the like) or what
the opportunity costs of these interventions are. Clearly, more research is needed to further clarify
these issues. Still, it is some interest that the very subsidiaries which have been hypothesised to be
most at risk of agency problems and tunneling do not seem to be performing badly, but instead very
well. The World Bank (2005), for example, highlighted concerns about the capacity and
willingness of state groups to exploit their listed subsidiaries. Clearly, our results suggest this is not
the case. Instead, the trend appears more consistent with the goal of creating internationally
competitive transnational businesses, one avowed goal of the policy (Nolan 2001).
In highlighting China’s business groups as an area of research we believe there are a number of
points that warrant mention and further investigation. Firstly, moving beyond the question of the
performance of firms affiliated to China’s trial business groups, we note that the influence of
China’s groups now arguably extends the reach of China’s state sector beyond the traditional
boundaries marked by standard ownership criteria. We have already noted that there were 2,856
officially recognized business groups with over 27,950 first-tier subsidiaries (averaging about 10
per group in which the ownership stake exceeded 50%) by the end of 2006. But how large are
China’s business groups if we include lower tiers of member firms? Delineating the exact
boundaries of business groups is notoriously difficult. Different and at times quite vague definitions
of what actually constitutes a group, and by extension group membership, exist. Granovetter, in a
seminal contribution, notes how groups have an ‘invisible nature’ (Granovetter 1993, p. 97). Thus
practical definitions of business groups are nearly always subjective and vary considerably across
countries. In post-war Japan’s case, for example, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) define group
membership as those firms which send members to the meetings of the ‘Presidents Clubs’. The
Korea Fair Trade Commission, on the other hand, defines a business group as ‘a group of
companies of which more than 30 percent of shares are owned by the group’s controlling
shareholder and its affiliated companies’ (the average number of affiliated firms within the
chaebols was 27 in 1998) (Bae and Jeong 2007, p.743). Other academics provide rather broad
definitions which are quite hard to apply (take Leff’s early definition, for example: ‘a group of
companies that does business in different markets under a common administrative or financial
control’ and that are ‘linked by relations interpersonal trust, on the basis of a similar personal,
ethnic or commercial background’ (Leff, 1978, p. 663). In short, there is considerable debate on
just how business groups should be defined (are social ties, for example, more important than
ownership ties?). The official Chinese definition of group membership, however, in including data
on first tier subsidiaries, arguably means China’s groups appear small in terms of actual
membership numbers. If, however, second and lower tier companies are included, China’s groups
would almost certainly appear considerably larger. The influence of China’s business groups,
therefore, is almost certainly greater than the already significant scale and reach highlighted by
official statistics. Given this, the performance impacts of group affiliation are clearly important to
understand.
Secondly, related to this point and also the important issue of affiliate ownership and control, is
the question of why business groups, often with controlling shareholders rather than free-standing
large enterprises with diffuse ownership, are becoming dominant in the Chinese economy. It is
important to note, in this regard, that it has recently been shown that it is only in the UK and US
that the free-standing diffuse ownership pattern of corporate governance structure truly exists (La
Porta et al, 1999). In this sense the evolution of China’s current business group structures, in which
some firms may come to control numerous other firms (both publicly listed and non-listed), is not
so surprising. In most countries (both developing and developed) large corporations often have
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controlling owners (usually wealthy families) and also pyramidal type control structures using
business groups. One feature of these ownership structures is that they may allow the controlling
family, or state body in China’s case, to vastly expand their control over firms and the economy as
a whole ‘without undertaking commensurate capital investments’ (Morck et al 2005, p. 655).
Indeed, one rationale for business groups, considered also to cause agency problems, is that they
allow firms to attract large volumes of external capital while maintaining ultimate control over firm
members. Raising capital through the creation of business groups has arguably been especially
appealing to incumbent state bodies at different levels in China (provincial and city governments,
for example). Business groups, therefore, provide attractive possibilities to leverage the influence
of state actors, thus facilitating control over large parts of the economy. This phenomenon,
whereby elites control vast swathes of an economy through business groups, has been referred to as
‘economic entrenchment’ (Morck et al 2005). It is also considered to be significant in
understanding economic performance across countries.
Thirdly, and following from the points above, as business groups absorb more firms and in turn
capital from different sources this leads to the diversification of ownership within business groups.
This raises numerous interesting questions about the role such groups play in ownership reform and
the boundaries of the traditional state owned economy in China. Much of the discussion, dating
from the debate of transition strategies (‘gradualism’ versus ‘big bang’ approaches) has dwelt upon
the issue of ownership and how this may impact on firm performance. Business groups, however,
may play an important role in blurring clear ownership boundaries. This is because they may allow
a state-owned parent company, through pyramidal type control chains, to control other non-state
firms. Liu and Pei (2005), for example, highlight what they believe to be the prevalence of such
control chains and the difficulty this presents in specifying the ultimate owner of listed firms. They
note, furthermore, that many firms officially designated as being non-state owned are in many
instances actually ultimately controlled by state owned business groups. The true extent of such
control chains and the role business groups play in expanding their control over the non-state sector
is an important question and warrants greater research. By 2006, for example, only 5,493 of the
27,950 first tier subsidiaries in China’s business groups remained registered as state owned. Over
14,000, by contrast, had been transformed into limited liability and 1,882 into stock holding
companies, opening up the way for ownership diversification and, arguably, the extension of the
control of elite state groups over non-state subsidiaries.
6. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper was to investigate the performance of the listed subsidiaries
of China’s trial business groups. Given the outstanding features of these groups, including their
greater institutional development, higher concentration of state ownership among the mother
company and their centrality to Chinese industrial policies (to create internationally competitive
business groups), it is of particular interest to investigate their performance. Our results are
surprising, in so far as a clear tendency to outperform other listed firms was found. We have
discussed possible interpretations for this and conclude that it appears consistent with the research
to date on China’s business groups.
To conclude, it is important to frame our findings within a broader context. The transition
orthodoxy, a paradigm strongly influenced by the ideas of mainstream neoclassical economics,
called for the rapid privatisation of large state owned enterprises, rapid liberalisation and close
integration with international markets. It also emphasised the importance of small private
enterprises in promoting economic growth and the impossibility of turning round state owned
enterprises (World Bank, 2002). The success of China’s economic reforms, therefore, has been
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described by recourse to the analogy of ‘a dry prairie, parched by years of planning, awaiting the
sprinklings of market reform’ (World Bank, 1997). In this analogy, success was attributable solely
to the ‘shoots’ of small private enterprises emerging in response to market forces. In so far as it
envisaged large enterprises taking a centre stage in economic development, it did so with reference
to the type of structures noted in the advanced capitalist economies, particularly the US and Britain
(i.e. free standing firms with diffuse ownership). This might be applicable to US or British firms,
which are generally, if not always, freestanding. Recent research, however, shows these types of
governance structures are highly atypical (La Porta et al, 1999). It is, in fact, more common,
particularly for large listed corporations, to belong to business groups, often in a pyramidal form,
with an identifiable controlling owner (as opposed to many small shareholders). Such structures
may also, and often do, allow small elites to control vast swathes of the corporate sector. The
complex types of ownership and control structures that actually predominate throughout the real
world, and the important role of business groups, particularly in developing countries with
imperfect markets, was therefore largely overlooked by this orthodox view. Here we have
highlighted the importance of these large groups and the need to further deepen our study of them.
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Table 1. National champion groups and other business groups: Institutional development
National champion
groups (%)
Other groups (%)
Full investment autonomy 95 91
International financing rights 46 25
Export credit guarantees 84 72
Independent import and export rights 96 69
Combined group tax payment 61 26
Rights to contract international projects 82 53
Rights to approve foreign business affairs 74 9
Technology and research centres 84 55
Finance companies 40 11
Note: This table reports the institutional development of 113 national champion groups and 2579 other
business groups in 2006. See Nolan (2001) for further details of these measures.
Source: SSBa (2006, p. 404).
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Table 2. National champion groups and other business groups: Aggregate financial characteristics
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average annual
change (%)
Panel A: National champion groups
Number 119 121 126 119 119 116 113 -0.8
Assets (US$ bn) 278.2 408.1 547.4 544.0 581.0 635.4 715.3 18.2
Turnover (US$ bn) 135.1 193.8 262.7 275.6 306.3 358.2 444.3 22.7
Employees (number) 7.6 9.9 11.2 9.9 9.3 8.8 9.0 3.8
R&D (US$ bn) 13.4 20.1 30.2 35.4 37.8 49.4 62.0 30.1
Exports (US$ bn) 9.0 9.8 16.5 17.6 17.7 21.7 23.9 19.5
Profits (US$ bn) 5.3 4.2 8.9 17.2 17.5 24.4 32.3 43.0
R&D/turnover (%) 9.9 10.4 11.5 12.8 12.3 13.8 14.0 6.1
Exports/turnover (%) 6.7 5.1 6.3 6.4 5.8 6.1 5.4 -2.4
Panel B: Other groups
Number 2,250 2,351 2,631 2,536 2,591 2,511 2,579 2.4
Assets (US$ bn) 328.4 399.1 504.7 745.0 961.7 1081.9 1334.9 26.8
Turnover (US$ bn) 204.7 228.8 264.6 366.1 484.3 571.0 761.7 24.9
Employees (number) 10.9 11.0 12.2 12.9 15.9 16.4 16.9 7.8
R&D (US$ bn) 27.5 30.8 33.3 41.9 57.5 62.5 83.3 20.9
Exports (US$ bn) 22.1 22.6 26.7 37.6 47.4 54.0 66.9 20.9
Profits (US$ bn) 9.4 8.9 11.9 17.8 21.2 25.9 34.6 25.5
R&D/turnover (%) 13.4 13.5 12.6 11.4 11.9 10.9 10.9 -3.2
Exports/turnover (%) 10.8 9.9 10.1 10.3 9.8 9.5 8.8 -3.3
Note: This table reports the aggregate financial characteristics for national champion groups and other business groups
over 1997-2003. We convert the Renminbi values to US dollars assuming 8.3 RMB to 1 US$. The figures are expressed
in 2004 real terms, deflated using the Chinese Consumer Price Index (OECD Factbook 2006). Source: SSBa (2004, pp.
30-3).
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Table 3. Sample description
Year National champion listed
subsidiaries
Other listed firms Total listed firms
1999 37 583 620
2000 39 624 663
2001 53 719 772
2002 56 825 881
2003 62 888 950
2004 66 904 970
# firm years 313 4,543 4,856
# unique firms 69 983 1,052
Notes: This table reports the firm year observations for the samples used in the analysis on a year by year
basis. Column (2) reports the number of firm year observations for all Chinese listed subsidiaries of national
champion groups in the Datastream and Osiris databases with all the financial variables described in Table 5
below available. Column (3) reports the number of firm year observations for all other Chinese listed firms in
the Datastream and Osiris databases with all the financial variables described in Table 5 below available.
Column (4) is the sum of columns (2) and (3). Firms classified as financial or real estate (US SIC 600-699
inclusive) are excluded throughout.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics
Variable # observations Mean Median Standard
deviation
25th percentile 75th percentile
Profitability 4,856 0.0599 0.0691 0.0899 0.0267 0.1107
Tobin’s Q 4,856 2.2870 1.9525 1.2437 1.3699 2.9088
Share return 4,856 -0.0689 -0.1440 0.3258 -0.3112 0.1477
Size 4,856 11.9820 11.9186 0.8073 11.4163 12.4995
Age 4,856 1.4298 1.6094 0.6451 1.0986 1.9459
Growth 4,856 0.1882 0.1398 0.3421 -0.0201 0.3505
Debt 4,856 0.0925 0.0365 0.1188 0.0000 0.1524
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on the variables employed in the analysis. Profitability is the
ratio of profit before interest and taxation divided by net assets. Tobin’s Q is book value of total assets plus
market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by book value of total assets. Share return is the
logarithm of the annual buy-and-hold share return between 1st January and 31st December, and takes account
of both dividends and stock splits Size is the logarithm of the book value of total assets at the beginning of
the year, which is adjusted for inflation by converting into 2004 real terms using the Chinese Consumer Price
Index (OECD Factbook 2006). Age is the logarithm of the number of years since the firm was first listed on
Datastream. Growth is the annual percentage growth rate in real sales. Debt is long term debt divided by the
sum of shareholder funds and long term debt. All variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles to remove influential outliers.
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Table 5. Performance of national champion listed subsidiaries
Independent
variables
Dependent variable
Profitability Tobin’s Q Share return
Intercept -0.184*** 12.232*** -0.190
-(3.53) (21.04) -(1.21)
National champion 0.012** 0.156*** 0.038**
(2.38) (2.95) (2.47)
Size 0.016*** -0.773*** 0.021***
(8.86) -(38.18) (4.19)
Age -0.014*** 0.035 0.017***
-(7.87) (1.44) (3.12)
Growth 0.091*** -0.009 0.126***
(23.72) -(0.21) (12.58)
Debt -0.126*** -0.234** 0.048
-(11.58) -(2.19) (1.61)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
# observations 4,856 4,856 4,856
R2 0.2332 0.5146 0.5439
F-statistic 22.22*** 85.62*** 124.06***
Notes: This table reports ordinary least squares regressions of company performance on national champion
affiliation and other variables. National champion is a dummy variable set equal to one for all Chinese listed
subsidiaries of national champion groups, zero otherwise. Other variables are as defined in Table 5. Industry
dummies are dummy variables set equal to one for each US SIC two digit code. All continuous variables
have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove influential outliers. t-statistics are in
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
